

39. (U) Ltr. 11 Jan. 1943
Fr: Douglas Airc. Co., Inc.
Santa Monica, Cal.
To: S.G., AAF Mat. Center, WF
Attn: Prod. Eng. Sect.
(File: Central Files)

Douglas informed Mat. Center (WF) that it would be impossible to meet the production schedule on A-26 airplanes. The limiting factor was not one of design engineering, which had been the controlling factor up to that time, but one of tooling and factory development. It had been planned to complete the first production airplane in July 1943, but because design changes in the airplane had delayed engineering release, Douglas estimated that initial deliveries of production airplanes on Contract ac-21393 would start at Douglas-Long Beach in October 1943, and on Contract ac-34433 at the Douglas plant at Tulsa, Okla. (hereinafter referred to as Douglas-Tulsa) in January 1944. (There was attached a comparative tabulation of S-L delivery schedules requested by Douglas and estimated delivery possibilities.)

Cont. # 34433

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Douglas Aircraft Company, Inc.

Santa Monica, California

Cable Address "Douglasair"

In reply refer to File

MUTUAL HOME BUILDING
Dayton, Ohio

A682-21393-32

January 11, 1943

Subject: A-26 Manufacturing Program
Contracts AC-21393, AC-34433

To: Commanding General
AAF Materiel Center
Wright Field, Dayton, Ohio

Attention: Production Engineering Section
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Reference: a. Materiel Center's letter SRB:maw-70-1
dated December 4, 1942.
b. Contractor's letter A25-AH-88 dated
December 17, 1942.
c. Materiel Center's PBS-TWX-430 dated
July 17, 1942.
d. Contractor's letter F25-4830 dated
November 26, 1942.

1. Paragraphs (1), (3), and (4) of reference a have been covered by separate letter, reference b.

2. Considering the present development status of the A-26 airplane, it is not possible to meet the production schedule contained in paragraph (2) of reference a. The limiting factor at this time is one of tooling and factory development rather than design engineering. Design engineering has been the controlling factor to date but the initial phase of this work will be completed within the next thirty (30) day period. The chief problem at present is one of condensing the tooling and factory development into the shortest possible elapsed time period.

3. It was planned to complete the initial production airplane in July, 1943. To accomplish this program, it was necessary to complete engineering releases for production during the period from 7-15-42 to 12-31-42. It was further necessary to complete releases on certain functional units during this period progressively according to their assembly relation. Although it is estimated that the initial engineering releases for production will be completed during January instead of December, certain functional units are from three (3) to four (4) months behind schedule within the overall release period.

4. An example of the condition outlined above is the fuselage structure. This unit was scheduled for engineering release on 7-15-42, but releases had not been completed at that time. Although this was a serious condition, it was believed that the delay could be picked up by squeezing subsequent operations and the ultimate schedule maintained. On July 17, 1942, the Contractor received a TWX from the Materiel Center, reference c., which quoted in part as follows, "Request Materiel Center be informed soon as possible of any delay involved in providing the seventy five m/m gun nose on all 500 A-26 airplanes on Contract 21393. Contractor is directed to take immediate action to provide the 75 m/m gun nose on all 500 A-26 airplanes on Contract AC21393." The Contractor immediately complied with this directive and as soon as a study could be made of the effect on ultimate delivery schedule, the Materiel Center was informed. This change required approximately 12,000 additional board hours in a schedule budget that was already overloaded. The net result was that the fuselage structure was delayed from 7-15-42 to a release period ranging from 10-1-42 to 1-15-43, which produced an average past due condition of about four (4) months.

5. Considering the fuselage structure as the limiting factor in the ultimate schedule, the Contractor estimated that initial airplane deliveries would be delayed by about three (3) months or until October, 1943. The Materiel Center was informed of this revised schedule on 11-26-42 by reference d.

6. In view of the urgency of this airplane program, the Contractor has requested that the 8-L schedule be set up to start in July, 1943 for Contract AC-21393 at the Long Beach Plant and in December, 1943 for Contract AC-34433 at the Tulsa Plant. Factory programs are set up on this basis and will be so maintained as long as possible. With respect to actual delivery commitments, however, it is necessary to consider present status as well as the tooling and factory development required from a realistic standpoint. Considering the preparation necessary for the high rate of production anticipated, the Contractor estimates that production deliveries will start in October, 1943 at the Long Beach Plant on Contract AC-21393 and three (3) months later or January, 1944 at the Tulsa Plant on Contract AC-34433. The Contractor cannot take the responsibility of promising earlier deliveries than those above in view of existing conditions. Attached is a comparative tabulation of 8-L schedules requested by the Contractor versus estimated delivery possibilities.

7. To clarify the statements above regarding flow time, the Contractor has prepared and enclosed two (2) comparative graphs, one each on the wing and fuselage structure illustrating the following

- a. Flow pattern necessary to produce initial airplane in June, 1943.
- b. Flow pattern necessary to produce initial airplane in July, 1943.

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- c. Flow pattern indicated by present status of development.

8. The delivery acceleration shown in paragraph (2) of reference a. is greater than previous experience has shown is possible. Attached is a labor chart showing labor load based on acceleration shown in reference letter compared with loads required to produce Contractor's estimated delivery schedule. Also shown are historical records of actual contracts for comparison. In accordance with instructions from the Materiel Center the Contractor is planning on an ultimate acceleration of 500 airplanes per month.

9. The special rolled spar cap sections for wing beams is an outstanding example of critical material shortage existing as of this date. Potentially this program will be subject to the Chronic shortages existing in various commodities on all contracts as well as the unforeseen procurement needs common to all development airplanes. This airplane, at present, has a #3 priority and it is essential that a higher priority and preference rating be assigned to insure against procurement delays, and our proposed delivery schedule is established considering that there will be no material delays.

10. It is noted that the 8-L schedule does not show Contract AC-21393 for 500 A-26 airplanes. This contract must be added to the 8-L schedule immediately if we are to obtain priority in delivery of material on outstanding purchase orders.

11. In the Contractor's opinion October is the earliest completion which may be reasonably anticipated for the initial production article. Furthermore, the maximum acceleration which may be anticipated is as set forth in the airplane delivery lay out comparison attached hereto entitled Douglas Delivery Estimate. However, every possible means of accelerating this program is being utilized, and the Contractor is bending every effort to meet the Center's desires where-in it is humanly possible to do so.

DOUGLAS AIRCRAFT COMPANY, INC.

by *J. M. Rogers*
JOHN M. ROGERS, VICE PRESIDENT
CONTRACT ADMINISTRATION

RFD:ban

cc: R.F. Dolan
H. Adams
F. Flerng
Raymond
MacDonald
T. Conant

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